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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEOBZB/12SWS THULE AB GL PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1330
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1868
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHFMISS/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGF SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUZEJAA/USNIC PRISTINA SR PRIORITY

Wednesday, 27 January 2010, 15:44
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRISTINA 000044

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR EUR (SCE, ACE, RPM)
EO 12958 DECL: 01/27/2020
TAGS PGOV, PINR, PREL, MARR, KV
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SUCCESS IN THE NORTH KEY TO A SUCCESSFUL
KFOR DRAWDOWN

REF: A. 09 PRISTINA 509 B. 09 USNATO 409 C. BELGRADE 0003
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER DELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

1. (C) SUMMARY: While skirmishes and security incidents may be rare from day to day, an impending frozen conflict in Northern Kosovo remains t
NORTHERN KOSOVO REMAINS THE BIGGEST THREAT TO SASE

12. (C) We have argued (ref A) that to achieve the conditions-based drawdown of KFOR troops agreed by the North Atlantic Council (ref B), it is
NORTHERN STRATEGY AN OPPORTUNITY

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13. (C) For much of the past ten years, pursuit of our strategic goal of a stable, democratic, multi- ethnic Kosovo has taken a back seat in th
14. (C) That this international and local alliance for action in Northern Kosovo comes while KFOR remains at a robust presence of roughly 10,00
ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE NORTH ARE PRACTICAL SASE BENCHMARKS

15. (SBU) While a robust KFOR is important to the success of the Northern Strategy, the implementation of the strategy is an opportunity for KE
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16. (SBU) As the NAC debates the move to "Gate 2" (5,000 troops) and beyond, we would argue that the time is ripe to move from a negative opera
-- successful establishment of the decentralized municipality of North Mitrovica;
-- re-establishment of collection of customs revenue at Gates 1 and 31, as part of a single, Kosovo-wide customs regime;
-- the staffing of the Mitrovica District Court with ethnic Serb and Albanian judges recognized by the Kosovo justice system;
-- enhanced EULEX police presence in Northern Kosovo, and the full integration of Kosovo Serb members of the Kosovo Police (KP) in Kosovo Polic
-- the replacement of illegal parallel municipal authorities in Northern Kosovo with, legal, legitimately constituted Kosovo bodies;
-- the arrest and prosecution of major organized crime figures; and,
-- the normalization of electric power distribution and billing throughout Northern Kosovo by KEK, according to UNMIK law and regulation.
STATUS NEUTRAL, NOT VALUE NEUTRAL

17. (C) Some may protest that the establishment of such benchmarks represents a break with KFOR's status neutral stance. This is patently untru
COMMENT

18. (C) For ten years, stability in Northern Kosovo has been defined as merely the lack of conflict. Today's KFOR, at "Gate 1" levels of 10,000
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full extent of its recognized borders, and KFOR's surest roadmap to a successful reduction in troop strength to "Gate 2" and beyond. DELL